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SEIZE, RUN, AND SUE:





For every three marriages solemnized in the United States each year,
one divorce is granted. In some states the statistics approach one in two.1
The most pernicious and tragic aspect of a broken American marriage
involving children is the custody-visitation aftermath. Therein lies a serious
indictment of the American juridical-legal-legislative system.2 For with
official recission of the nuptial contract, begin the often devious and
vengeful machinations and maneuvers of noncustodian v. custodian-open
to hearing and rehearing3 in the courtrooms of 52 jurisdictions4-all
masquerading in the guise of doing what is in the best interest of the
child. If he or she is dissatisfied, the noncustodial parent need only hire an
attorney, establish some "minimum contacts" with another state, transport
the child there on his first "visitation" with him,5 and the battle is on
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Kansas City; BA, Case
Western Reserve University; MA, MALS, University of Wisconsin; JD, LLM,
Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law.
1. In 1972 there were 2,269,000 marriages and 839,000 divorces in the
United States. Wonx.n ALMANAC Am Boox oF FACTs, 1973, at 1016 (c. 1974).
In California in 1972 there were 173,563 marriages and 111,162 divorces; a
ratio of nearly one to one.
2. Hazard, May v. Anderson: Preamble to Family Law Chaos, 45 VA. L.
REv. 379 (1959). "[T]he struggle between divorced spouses over the custody of
their children has transcended the brutality and irregularity of guerrilla warfare."
Id. at 392.
3. In Munroe v. Munroe, 47 Wash. 2d 391, 287 P.2d 482 (1955), during
a 3-year period, the divorced husband and wife filed between 20 and 30 con-
tempt actions against each other. In Hixson v. Hixson, 199 Ore. 559, 263 P.2d
597 (1953), the ex-husband filed between 60 and 70 documents in regard to
custody after the divorce. See Davis, Children of Divorced Parents: Sociological
and Statistical Analysis, 10 LAw & CoN'rEM . PROB. 700, 708 (1944), wherein it
says that after a divorce, the child can serve as a convenient instrument through
which former spouses can express their mutual resentment.
4. This includes the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.
In Crowell v. Crowell, 184 Ore. 467, 198 P.2d 992 (1948), for example, a
habeas corpus action, the Oregon Supreme Court had to choose between the
enforcement of 5 decrees made at various times in Oklahoma and Texas courts.
In Allen v. Allen, 200 Ore. 278, 268 P.2d 358 (1954), a son and daughter of
tender years were subject to 7 separate custodial contentions between their par-
ents in 9 years in the courts of Oklahoma, California, and Oregon.
5. Denial of visiting privileges with the noncustodial parent is virtually
unknown, unless he or she is a pervert, habitual criminal, drug addict, alcoholic,
(521)
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Often lasting for the duration of the child's non-age, it is nurtured by
jurists, social workers, and child psychiatrists and psychologists. 6
One writer noted that there were approximately nine children in the
families of every ten persons granted divorces and about one third of a
million children whose parents got divorces each year in the United States.
In about 90 percent of these cases custody of the children is awarded
to the mother.7 Regardless of the statutory language as to the equality of
parental rights, the mother because of the "mystique of motherhood" has
an advantage which is decisive, especially with children under 12-unless
she is clearly shown to be unfit." Frequently, irreconcilable disputes de-
velop over visitation-and often custody-irrespective of who is granted
custodianship.
The unprecedented mobility of Americans during and after World
War II and the increasing rate of family breakup and other social changes
in the 1950's and 1960's have accentuated the problem. Serious complica-
tions dealing with unresolved jurisdictional conflicts arise when the litiga-
tion crosses state lines-with competition between courts being added to
competition between claimants. 9 Professor Hazard deplored this reproachful
or has been declared mentally incompetent, Godbey v. Godbey, 70 Ohio App.
450, 44 N.E.2d 810 (1942); but see Friedland v. Friedland, 174 Cal. App. 2d
874, 845 P.2d 322 (1959); Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 207-08 (1963).
6. In case No. 247774, Juvenile Court, Cuyahoga County, Ohio, 1968,
the caseworker, in the face of an overwhelmingly positive investigation favoring
the mother, apparently acting under the courts instructions, threatened the
mother with loss of custody of her 3-year-old son if she did not dismiss her
application to restrict the father's visiting rights to Cuyahoga County, Cleveland,
Ohio. When the mother sought relief through the courts chief psychiatrist, he
refused to acknowledge, in his professional capacity, that subjecting a child of
that age to annual 2-month visits 2000 miles away from home and to further
unnecessary litigation in another state was contrary to the best interests of the
minor, although he avowed this position privately and socially.
7. P. SImoN, STEPCHILD im hE FAnLY at 77-78 (1964).
8. Oster, Custody Proceedings: A Study of Vague and Indefinite Standards,
5 J. Fm. L. 21, 29 (1965). See e.g., Horst v. McLain, 466 S.W.2d 187 (K.C.
Mo. App. 1971).
9. Ingenuously, this exigency has been described as: "the law of thejungle" bringing "misery to countless children of divorce and other broken
homes," Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody jurisdiction Act, 3 FAM. L.Q.
304, 806 (1969); "where possession apparently is not merely nine points of the
law but all of them and self-help the ultimate authority... .," May v. Anderson,
345 U.S. 528, 539 (1929) (Justice Jackson dissenting); and "where the child
loses his home, not because of any urgent necessity from the standpoint of the
care he receives, but to satisfy the urge to continue the marital discord at its
most vulnerable point ... the competition for the affection and control of the
children." Bodenheimer, supra at 305.
Justice Rutledge concurring in New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 830 U.S.
610 (1,947), wrote:
... the effect of the decision may be to set up an unseemly litigious
competition between the states and their respective courts as well as
between parents. Sometime, somehow, there should be an end to liti-
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condition over a decade ago. He characterized the "parental right of cus-
tody" as not worth the paper on which it is written,"'10 and he proceeded
even more graphically:
The child is filched from classroom, playground, public street, or
his home, transported out of the state and perhaps across the
country by the abducting parent, there to be held pending a
counter-foray by the other parent. Meanwhile each parent recruits
the assistance of his home court, sometimes of courts elsewhere,
seeking by various procedures to strengthen his grip on the child
and to loosen that of the other parent."
Few courts have dealt with the dire problem positively and only five
state legislatures have.12 The United States Supreme Court has avoided
deciding the issue, thus withholding all federal controls from interstate
custody law.13
As the Reporter for the Special Committee of the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws has noted, when there has been one upheaval in
a child's life because of divorce or some other ill fate, what the child needs
most is "stability, security, and continuity."14 Dr. Andrew Watson, psy-
chiatrist and professor of law, deems stability "practically the principal ele-
ment in raising children, especially pre-puberty ones"; and he maintains that
"a child can handle almost anything better than he can handle instability."15
A growing child's need for stability of environment and constancy
of affection, especially when subjected to the trauma of a disinte-
grated home, seems today a well-accepted fact, verifying old truths
gathered from long experience of mankind .... custody decisions
once made "should nearly always be permanent and irrevocable.'10
Dr. Herbert Modlin of the Menninger Foundation emphasizes the "con-
stancy of mothering" and the persistence of "the requirement of continuity
and a sense of family, satisfying a need to belong," 7 irrespective of the
10. Hazard, May v. Anderson: Preamble to Family Law Chaos, 45 Va. L.
Iv. 379, 395 (1959).
11. Id. at 392-93.
12. The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act has been adopted in four
states. See note 187 infra.
13. Thus far in its history, the United States Supreme Court has dealt with
four child custody cases on certiorari: Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962)
Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953)
New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947); In all four cases the
Court evaded the issue of a state giving full faith and credit to a custody decree
of a sister state.
14. Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: A Legisla-
tive Remedy for Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22 VAND. L. REv.
1207, 1208 (1969).
15. Proceedings of Special Committee on Uniform Divorce and Marriage
Act, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, at 98, 101(Dec. 15-16, 1968); A. WATsoN, PsYCHIATnY FOR LAwYLes 159, 197 (1968).
For a review of the book's effect on American courts see Time, Sep. 30, 1974, at 65.
16. A. WATsoN, supra note 15, at xi-xii, 197.
17. 1963 Proceedings, Section of Family Law, American Bar Association in
H. FAiN, READNGS IN LAW AND PsYCHIATRY 319-22 (1968).
19741
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other needs of the various growth periods. Professor Homer Clark, con-
curring with Drs. Watson and Modlin, deplores the transferral of a child
from one parent to another by conflicting court decrees.18
In 1963 the American Bar Association at its annual conference heard
this warning voiced:
The manner in which the courts deal with these victims of domestic
catastrophe has an impact, directly or indirectly, on a substantial
proportion of our people. It presents a challenge to the stability of
our social institutions and is assuming threatening significance.' 9
A decade later, in 1973, Professors Joseph Goldstein and Albert Solnit
of Yale University, and Dr. Anna Freud of the Hampstead Child-Therapy
Clinic, London, England, published their study Beyond the Best Interests
of the Child-decrying the role American courts play in mishandling de-
pendent children. While their findings dealt primarily with adopted and
foster children, the authors made the following observations about custody
in divorce and separation:
: .. The absence of finality coupled with the concomitant increase
in opportunities for appeal are in conflict with the child's need for
continuity.... In addition certain conditions such as visitations may
themselves be a source of discontinuity .... Loyalty conflicts are
common and normal under such conditions and may have devastat-
ing consequences by destroying the child's positive relationship to
both parents ....
Once it is determined who will be the custodial parent, it is that
parent, not the court, who must decide under what conditions he
or she wishes to raise the child. Thus, the noncustodial parent
should have no legally enforceable right to visit the child, and the
custodial parent should have the right to decide whether it is
desirable for the child to have such visits. What we have said is, to
protect the security of an ongoing relationship-that between the
child and the custodial parent.20
Yet-in the light of these insights and realities-contemporary law
and judicial practice relating to child custody and visitation are an anti-
thesis that shocks the conscience!
I. ANEmucAN CmiiD CUSTODY LAWS
A. Development of English Child Custody Laws
Under the old Persian, Egyptian, Greek, Gallic, and Roman law, the
father had absolute power over his children. Infanticide was legal, as was
the selling of sons and daughters into slavery, on the theory that he who
gave could also take away. In ancient Rome this power did not cease upon
18. H. CLArx, THE LAw OF Dommsnc RELAnoNs 826 (1968).
19. H. FAN, supra note 17, at 316.
20. J GOLDSTEiN, A. FimuD, & A. SOLNiT, BBYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD 87-38 (1978) (emphasis added). For a review of the book's effect on
American courts see TIME, Sep. 30, 1974, at 65.
[Vol. 39
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the child's attainment of majority, but continued for the life of the paterfamilias.21
In feudal England custody was automatically an incident of guardian-
ship of lands. Only gradually did it come to be regarded as a trusteeship
with responsibility toward the child.2 2 The Court of Wards and Liveries,
established during the reign of Henry VIII, developed some measure of
protection for children. A 1660 statute transferred jurisdiction over them
to the chancery courts, which assumed the Crown's prerogative of parens
patriae to care for infants.23
At English common law the mother had no rights in regard to her
children; she was entitled only to reverence and respect. The father had
full authority over and custody of the children. These rights flowed from
his duties of maintenance, care, education, and control. While the former
were easily executed by courts, enforcement of the latter-then, as today--
presented insuperable difficulties and insoluble problems, which gradually
led to an erosion of paternal authority, subject to centuries of stubborn
challenge.
In 1837, Mr. Serjeant Talfourd described the pathos of the mother if
her husband chose to abandon her:
Not only may she be prevented from bestowing upon them [her
children] in their early infancy those solicitudes of love for the
absence of which nothing can compensate-not only may she be
prevented from tending upon them in the extremity of sickness,
but she may be denied the sight of them; and if she should obtain
possession of them by whatever means, may be compelled by the
writ of habeas corpus to resign them to her husband or his agents
without condition-without hope. That is the law ... and how is it
enforced? By process of contempt, issued at the instance of the
husband against his wife, for her refusal to obey it, under which
she must be sent to prison, there to remain until she shall yield
or until she shall die.24
In 1839 Parliament altered child custody law by providing that, upon
the petition of the mother, the Lord Chancellor and Master of the Rolls
might at his discretion enter an order allowing the mother access to her
children or, if the child was under the age of seven years, giving the
mother custody until they attained that age, subject to any regulations
deemed convenient and just. The order was enforceable by a contempt ac-
tion. The only absolute bar to the mother's petition for custody was a con-
viction of adultery in an action brought by her husband or by a similar
sentence issued by an ecclesiastical court.25
21. W. BLACKSTONE, 1 COM MENTAME ON THE LA-s oF ENGLAND, 451(T. Cooley 3d ed. 1884); 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AErmcAN LAV, 204-05
(lth ed. 1867).22. A. JAcoBs & J. GOEBEL, CASES ON Domsic RELATIONS 880-82 (4th
ed. 1962).
23. Foster & Freed, Child Custody, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 442 (1969).
24. 39 PARLmAMENTARY DEBATES, at col. 1082 (3d ser. 1837).
25. 2 & S Vict., c. 54 (1839).
1974]
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The Act of 1873 extended the period during which infants might
remain in their mother's custody to the age of sixteen years.26 The Guardian-
ship of Infants Act of 1925 at long last established the welfare of the child
as the paramount consideration in determining its custody.27 The Child
and Young Persons Act of 1933 provided that a parent or guardian could
be deprived of a child's custody if he or she were found unfit or unable to
fulfill his or her parental responsibilities.28
B. Early American Child Custody Laws
James Kent, Chief Justice and Chancellor of the New York Supreme
Court and Professor of Law at Columbia University, in his Commentaries
noted that the father's duty to maintain and educate his children during
their minority was absolute, but the obligation to support did not extend
to the mother. In consequence thereof, the father was generally entitled to
the custody of their persons and to the value of their labors and services.
This was an absolute right until the children reached at least the age of
fourteen-and by inference of the law-until they reached the age of
twenty-one.29
If his children were improperly detained, a father could regain their
custody by suing out a writ of habeas corpus. Courts of law and equity
would then investigate the circumstances and the inclinations of the in-
fants and, utilizing sound discretion, place a child where they deemed
best, which sometimes meafit retention of control by third persons, par-
ticularly where the morals, safety, or interests of the infants demanded it. On
a father's death, the mother's right to custody was superior to that of others.30
One of the earliest American cases to consider the matter of child
custody was Commonwealth v. Addicks.31 Involved were two girls aged
seven and ten. About four years prior to the filing of the suit, the father,
Joseph Lee, had become financially embarassed and was unable to support
his family. The mother, Barbara Addicks, kept a boardinghouse, using the
proceeds to maintain and educate her children. A minor son had continued
to live with Lee. Following her abandonment by Lee, she assumed a rela-
tion ship with Addicks, whom she married after Lee obtained a divorce
from her in 1813. Pennsylvania law32 forbade a spouse guilty of adultery
from marrying the paramour during the lifetime of the former husband
or wife. Lee petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus on grounds of Barabara's
immoral conduct and that his improved circumstances enabled him to
26. 86 & 87 Viet., c. 12.
27. 15 & 16 George V, c. 45.
28. 28 George V, c. 12, §§ 61 & 62.
29. 2 J. KENT, supra note 21, at 190-94.
30. Id. at 194, 203-05.
31. 5 Binney's Reports 519 (Pa. S. Ct., 1813).
32. Act of September 19, 1785, ch. MCLXXVI, § 7, 2 Laws of the Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania 843 (1810).
[tVol. 39
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support the children. There were no allegations of unfitness against the
mother.
Chief Justice Tilghman of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court utilized
the rationale which later came to be called the "best interests of the child"
doctrine. Although he expressed disapprobation of the mother's conduct,
he observed that she had taken good care of the girls in all respects. In
consideration of this and their tender age, he concluded that they stood
in need of assistance which could be provided by none so well as a
mother. Exercising his discretion, he continued custody in the mother,
with visiting privileges accorded the father.
By contrast, in People ex rel. Barry v. Mercein,33 the New York Supreme
Court retrogressed in utilizing the "paramount right of the father" doctrine.
One Eliza Anna Mercein, of New York City, married John Barry of Nova
Scotia, in 1835. The family moved back and forth several times. Finally, in
1838, Barry decided to remain in his native land. He took with him four
children of a previous marriage and the couple's son. In 1839 he sought
by habeas corpus the custody of their 19-month old daughter. On the fifth
writ he succeeded. The Court of Correction of Errors reversed in 1840, by
a vote of 19 to 3,34 only to be reversed by the Supreme Court on a sixth
writ in 1842.3r Justice Bronson described the superior claims of the father
as "the law of the land ... in accordance with law of God,"36 although he
admitted that such laws might not have "kept pace with progress of
civilization."37
In 1881, in the case of Chapsky v. Wood,8 Justice Brewer of the Kan-
sas Supreme Court for the first time expressed in the United States what is
termed the "best interests of the child" doctrine. He held that irrespective
of the issues of the case and the rights of others, the paramount considera-
tion before the court was: "What will promote the welfare of the child?"
Plaintiff father sought possession of his five-and-a-half-year-old daughter
whom he had gifted to his wife's sister at birth-the mother being too ill to
care for her-while he satisfied his wanderlust. In a unanimous decision the
Kansas tribunal continued custody in the maternal aunt, observing:
... an affection for the child is seen in Mrs. Wood that can be
83. 3 Hill 899 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842).
34. 25 Wend. 64 (Ct. for the Correction of Errors 1840).
35. 3 Hill 399 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842).
36. Id. at 422-23. This is in marked contrast to the Chancellor's opinion in
the Court of Errors expressing:
... the mother is the most proper person to be entrusted with the cus-
tody of a child of this tender age . .. "the law of nature had given to
her an attachment for her infant offspring which no other relative will
be likely to possess in an equal degree. And where no sufficient reason
exists for depriving her of the care and nurture of her child, it would
not be a proper exercise of discretion in any court to violate the law of
nature in this respect."
People v. Mercein, 25 Wend. 64, 106 (Ct. for the Correction of Errors 1840).
37. 3 Hill 399 at 422 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842).
88. 26Kan. 650 (1881).
1974]
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found nowhere else. And it is apparent, that so far as a mother's
love can be equaled, its foster-mother has that love, and will con-
tinue to have it.39
An unfortunate milestone in child custody litigation history was
reached in 1905 by the New York County, New York, Supreme Court, in
the case of People ex rel. Sinclair v. Sinclair,4" when it arbitrarily decided
that a five-year-old boy was no longer of such tender age that he needed
maternal love and care. The "paramount right of the father" doctrine pre-
vailed, as Judge Bischoff reversed the mother's custody decree, citing the
Barry-Mercein case, and holding that the attainment of such age constituted
a sufficient change of condition to warrant the action.41
Not all states were as blind to the needs of infants as was New York.
Kansas42 and Oregon 43 statutorily gave both parties equal rights to cus-
todianship of their children before the turn of the century. Many others
eventually followed suit.44
C. The United States Supreme Court and Child Custody
Our highest tribunal has considered the issue of custody and the
interstate child only four times in its history. People ex rel. Halvey v. Hal-
veyr came before it in 1947. The Halveys were married in 1937. In 1944,
without her husband's consent, Mrs. Halvey and their young son went to
Florida to establish residence. In 1945 she filed for divorce there. Mr.
Halvey, served by publication, made no appearance. The day before the
decree awarding Mrs. Halvey a divorce and permanent care, custody, and
control of the child was granted, Mr. Halvey secreted his son back to
New York. Thereafter, Mrs. Halvey brought a habeas corpus in a New
York Supreme Court, challenging her former spouse's detention of their
child.40
Following a hearing, the New York court ordered that custody was to
remain in the mother, but it was subject to visiting rights in the father
which included having his son with him during a certain vacation period
each year. Further, Mrs. Halvey was ordered to file a $5,000 bond, condi-
tioned on her delivering up the child to the father in Florida each year.
The order was subsequently affirmed by all courts,4 7 including the United
States Supreme Court on certiorari. Justice Douglas wrote the opinion,
utilizing the rationale that full faith and credit did not have to be given
to the Florida decree. Since Florida could modify the custody decree, the
39. Id. at 657.
40. 95 N.Y.S. 861 (1905).
41. Id. at 862.
42. KAN. CONST., art. 15, § 6 (1859); see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 88-201 (1935).
48. Or. LAws, 1880, at 7, § 2; see also OmE. CODE ANN. § 33-804 (1980).
44. See e.g., OHio REv. CODE, § 3109.03 (1972).
45. 830 U.S. 610 (1947).
46. 185 Misc. 52, 55 N.Y.S. 2d 761 (1945).
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courts of any other state could do likewise.48
The court did not consider the other questions argued: (1) whether
Florida had jurisdiction over the child;49 (2) whether the Florida decree of
custody, lacking personal service, bound Mr. Halvey; (3) whether New
York had greater power to modify the decree; (4) whether a state which
has jurisdiction over the child, regardless of a custody decree rendered by
another state, may make such orders regarding custody as the welfare of
the child from time to time requires. These issues were reserved for decision
at a later date.50
May v. Anderson51 reached the Supreme Court on certiorari in 1953.
At issue was whether or not in a habeas corpus proceeding attacking the
right of the mother to retain possession of her minor children, an Ohio court
must give full faith and credit to a Wisconsin decree awarding custody of
the children to their father in an ex parte divorce action.5 2 In an opinion
written by Justice Burton, the Court replied in the negative.
The Andersons were married and lived in Wisconsin. By mutual agree-
ment, Mrs. Anderson took the children to her home in Lisbon, Ohio, in
1946, following a family rift. Upon notification, on New Year's Day, 1947,
of her intent to remain there, Anderson filed for divorce, serving defendant
wife in Ohio personally. She made no appearance. He was awarded both
the divorce and the custody of the children, with Mrs. Anderson receiving
the right to visit them at reasonable times.
Armed with the Wisconsin decree and accompanied by a local police
officer, Anderson then obtained the children from their mother in Lisbon,
Ohio, and took them to his home where they ostensibly remained until
1951 when he allowed them to visit her. This time she refused to sur-
render them, whereupon the father sued out a writ of habeas corpus and
regained their possession in the Probate Court of Columbiana County,
Ohio. The action was affirmed on appeal.5 3 The Ohio Supreme Court re-
fused to certify the case.54
The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision, as Justice
Burton declared: "Bights far more precious to appellant than property
rights will be cut off if she is to be bound by the Wisconsin award of cus-
tody."5 5 The tribunals rationale was based on the rule that the full faith
48. 380 U.S. 610 at 614-15 (1947).
49. Under Florida law, a valid decree of child custody depends on the child
being either domiciled or present on its soil. However, the child's domicile
usually follows the father's. Id. at 618n.2. Thus Justice Jackson concurred in the
result on grounds of lack of jurisdiction by the Florida court.
50. Id. at 615-16.
51. 845U.S. 528 (1958).
52. It should be noted that the children were not in the state when the
custody decree was awarded.
53. 91 Ohio App. 557, 107 N.E.2d 858 (Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 157
Ohio St. 486, 105 N.E.2d 648 (1952).
54. 157 Ohio St. 486, 105 N.E.2d 648 (1952).
55. 845 U.S. 528, 588 (1958).
1974]
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and credit clause and the act of Congress passed pursuant to it (28 U.S.C.
§ 1738) do not entitle a judgment in personam to extraterritorial effect if
it was rendered without jurisdiction over the person sought to be bound.
Justice Frankfurter, concurring with Justice Burton, observed:
* * * Children have a very special place in life which law should
reflect. Legal theories and their phrasing in other cases readily
lead to fallacious reasoning if uncritically transferred to determi-
nation of a State's duty toward children ... the child's welfare in
a custody case has such a claim upon the State that its responsi-
bility is obviously not to be foreclosed by a prior adjudication
reflecting another State's discharge of its responsibility at another
time.90
Justice Jackson voiced strong disapproval of the majority view, noting
that such a "cardiac consideration" appeared to be grounded in a misap-
prehension between proceedings in rem and in personam, the decision
ostensibly equating jurisdictional requirements for a custody decree with
those for a personal money judgment. He went on to say that the assump-
tion that in its absence a state is constitutionally impotent in the absence
of personal jurisdiction of the parents to resolve questions of custody flew
in the face of the Court's own cases. Prophetically, he foresaw that the
decision would author new confusions which would reduce the law of
custody to a rule of seize-and-run. 57
Kovacs v. Brewer58 placed before the Supreme Court the issue of what
restriction, if any, the Constitution of the United States imposes on a state
court when it is determining the custody of the child before it; or, more
specifically: Did the federal Constitution require North Carolina to give
effect to a New York child custody decree?
Petitioner Aida Kovacs and George Brewer, Jr. were married in New
York City in 1945. Their daughter, Jane Elizabeth, was born in 1946. In
January, 1951, Brewer was granted a divorce by a New York court which
awarded custody of the child to the paternal grandfather pending the dis-
charge of the father from the Navy. After the rendering of the decree,
petitioner hid with her child. Respondent grandfather found his grand-
daughter and recovered possession of her on a writ of habeas corpus. He
took her to his home in North Carolina, where she remained during the
pendency of the appeal through the United States Supreme Court.
In 1954, after marrying one Kovacs, petitioner applied to the New York
court for a change of custody, which request was granted. The grandfather
refused to deliver the child to the mother, who fourteen months later in
1956, sued to recover her daughter in his home county in North Carolina.
A hearing de nova resulted, with all parties present and represented. The
North Carolina court determined that it did not have to give effect to the
56. Id. at 587-38.
57. Id. at 539-40.
58. 356 U.S. 604 (1958). Discussed in 44 A.B.A.J. 772 (1958).
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1954 New York decree, and it denied the mother's petition. The North
Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the New York decree was
without extraterritorial effect, since the child had not been before it when
the decree was rendered.59
The United States Supreme Court, Justice Black presiding, vacated the
judgment of the North Carolina Supreme Court and remanded the cause
to the lower courts to determine definitively the issue of changed circum-
stances, if any, between the 1954 New York decree and the filing of pe-
titioner's suit in North Carolina. Justice Black felt that the North Carolina
Supreme Court had not clarified it; but in view of the evidence below, he
thought it may have intended to decide the case alternatively on that
basis. He held that if North Carolina courts properly found that changed
conditions showed it in the best interest of the child for custody to continue
in the grandfather, then decision of the constitutional questions before the
United States Supreme Court was unnecessary. 0
Justice Frankfurter dissented on grounds that the implication of the
majority opinion was that unless circumstances had changed since the
rendering of the New York decree, it had to be given full faith and credit.
He observed that the purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause was to
preclude dissatisfied litigants from taking advantage of the federal charac-
ter of the nation by relitigating issues in one state that had been decided
in another. However, he deemed determining the proper custody of chil-
dren to be a more important consideration than curbing litigious strife.
Both the underlying purpose of the clause and the nature of custody de-
crees militate strongly against a constitutionally enforced requirement of
respect to foreign decrees. He noted that the North Carolina Supreme
Court had already declared unqualifiedly that it was not bound by the
New York decree. If it was subsequently obliged to find that conditions
had changed since the second New York decree in order not to be bound
by it, then a fortiori the latter decree had legal significance under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause. While Justice Frankfurther agreed that his Court
should be rigorous in avoiding constitutional issues where a reasonable
alternative exists, he thought such an issue cannot and is not avoided when
a ruling is made that includes one-even though by implication. He would
have affirmed the judgment of the North Carolina Supreme Court.61
Ford v. Ford62 also dealt with full faith and credit. Litigation in regard
to custody began in 1959, when the husband filed a writ of habeas corpus
in a Virginia court alleging that his wife was an unfit person to keep their
three children and requesting that custody be awarded to him. Mrs. Ford
sought dismissal of the writ. Thereafter by mutual agreement the parties
59. 856 U.S. 604, 609-11 (1958).
60. Id. at 607-08.
61. Id. at 609-16.
62. 871 U.S. 187 (1962). 73 YrA L.J. 134 (1968); 64 W. VA. L. R.v.
427 (1962); 49 A.B.A.J. 198 (1963).
1974]
11
Hudak: Hudak: Seize, Run, and Sue
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1974
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
stipulated that Mr. Ford was to have custody during the school year, and
Mrs. Ford during summer vacations and holidays. Notified of this, the
Virginia court dismissed the case.63
Nine months later, in August, 1960, when the children were with her
in Greenville, South Carolina, Mrs. Ford initiated a suit for full custody
in the local juvenile court. Mr. Ford made a general appearance alleging
the mother's unfitness and the prior agreement. After a plenary hearing
which included the testimony of eleven witnesses, the trial judge, although
finding both parents fit, held that in the best interest of the children the
mother should have custody and control. He also refused to treat as res
judicata the order of dismissal in the Virginia court on the issue of fitness. 4
The South Carolina Supreme Court subsequently reversed, its rationale
being that if Mrs. Ford had instituted in Virginia courts the action she
began in South Carolina, Mr. Ford could have successfully interposed the
defense of res judicata. Thus, since the judgment entered by agreement in
the Virginia court was res judicata in that state, it was deemed to be
entitled to full faith and credit in South Carolina. 5
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether the South Carolina Supreme Court had rested its judgment upon
a proper base. Reviewing Virginia law, Justice Black cited Mullen v.
Mullen 8 noting that the infant's welfare is the primary, paramount and
controlling consideration of a court in all controversies over the custody of
minor children and that all other matters are subordinate. Noting further
that by authority of Buchanan v. Buchanan,7 the custody and welfare of
children are not the subject of barter, he believed that Virginia courts
would not consider themselves bound by a mere order of dismissal, where,
as here, the trial judge never saw the agreement for custody and heard no
testimony upon which to base a judgment as to what would be best for
the children. 8
Thus, Justice Black held, consistent with the Court's prior opinion in
Halvey,69 that whatever a Virginia court could do in a case where another
court had exercised its judgment before awarding custody, the South
Carolina court was also free to do without preclusion by the Full Faith
and Credit Clause. The South Carolina Supreme Court had clearly been
in error, and the cause was reversed and remanded to it for further pro-
ceedings not inconsistent with the opinion."O
63. 371 U.S. 187, 187-88 (1962).
64. Id. at 188-90.
65. Id. at 192-94.
66. 188 Va. 259, 49 S.E.2d 349 (1948).
67. 170 Va. 458, 197 S.E. 426 (1938).
68. 371 U.S. 187, 194 (1962).
69. 830 U.S. 610 (1947).
70. 371 U.S. 187, 194 (1962).
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The consequences of these four decisions by the United States Su-
preme Court have been disastrous to countless children of broken homes.
Child custody litigation in American courts is confused and chaotic-to
use mild epithets.
III. TimoRms OF JURISDICflON IN INTERSTATE
CUSTODY-VISITATION SUITS
In refusing to enforce or recognize custody-visitation awards of sister
states, courts have relied mainly on three theories: (1) the jurisdictional
defect theory; (2) the changed circumstances or conditions theory; and
(3) the concurrent jurisdiction theory.
Under the first of these, the court of the second state can re-examine
the original decree because (1) the child was neither present nor domi-
ciled in the state making the award during the pendency of the suit, and
thus the decree is a nullity7' or (2) both parents were not before the court
(ex parte divorce) and thus the rights of the absent parent could not be
adjudicated.7 2
Under the second theory, the second court, as parens patriae allegedly
acting in the child's best interests, can reexamine the custody decree even
when the child is but temporarily in the state. The foreign award is deemed
res judicata as of the time it was entered only, and it is not binding on the
courts of the sister state.73 Although authorities have urged courts to exer-
cise sell-restraint and give due respect for foreign decrees before relitigat-
ing child custody,74 some courts have reached various desired-and, at
times, predetermined-results75 by grasping at any straw to find a "change
71. 4 A.L.R.2d 7, 14, 25, 69 (1949); RESTATFmENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS,
§ 117, 145-48 (1934); Goodrich, Custody of Children in Divorce Suits, 7 Con-
NELL L.Q. 1 (1921); Note, Custody of Children and Conflict of Laws, 24 HA.lv.
L. REv. 142 (1910).
72. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953); Annot. 4 A.L.R.2d 7, 71 (1921).
73. See New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1917), wherein
Justice Douglas wrote that the Constitution requires that a state shall give to the
judgment of a court of a sister state only the force and effect to which it is en-
titled in the state where it is rendered; and if the courts of the latter state can
modify a minor-child custody order or decree upon a proper showing of a change
of circumstances subsequent to its rendition, the courts of another state can do
likewise. Id. at 614. See also Ebrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Custody
Decrees, 51 MICH. L. REv. 345 (1953) for the rule followed by the various states.
74. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Carman, 471 S.W.2d 275 (Mo. 1971); Ratner,
Child Custody in a Federal System, 62 MICH. L. REv. 795 (1964).
75. In the case discussed note 6 supra, the juvenile Court, without cause or
rationale, at various hearings within a one and a half year period of time altered
the three year old child's visitations, to suit the father's convenience, from two
periods of 31 and 25 days to one period of 57 days; to one period of 62 days; to
one period of 60 days; to one period of 30 days and two one-week periods, to
one 45 day period-all in contravention of the court psychiatrist's recommenda-
tion. The court ordered the child shuttled back and forth between El Paso and
Cleveland-a 2000 mile span-in spite of evidence that the child was suffering
from a heart defect and in spite of the father's history of abandonment, physical
19741
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of circumstances."7 6 To echo the words of Justice Prentice of the Con-
necticut Supreme Court in Morrill v. Morrill:77 "[A] finding of changed
conditions is one easily made when a court is so inclined, and plausible
grounds therefor can quite generally be found. . .. "
The third theory, ostensibly juridically launched in 1948 by Judge
Traynor in the California Supreme Court decision of Sampsell v. Superior
Court,79 opened a Pandora's box of legally unbounded "discretion" to
judges when it declared:
There is authority for the proposition that courts of two or more
states may have concurrent jurisdiction over the custody of a child
... In the interest of the child, there is no reason why the state
where the child is actually living may not have jurisdiction to act
to protect the child's welfare, and there is likewise no reason why
other states should not also have jurisdiction.80
Judge Traynor cited an earlier legal article by Professor Stansbury:
... A court of any state that has a substantial interest in the wel-
fare of the child... has jurisdiction to determine its custody, and
this jurisdiction may exist in two or more states at the same time
.... A judicial determination of custody in one state is not binding
on the courts of a second state, ... 81
Under any of the above theories, the outcome of custody relitigation
too frequently turns upon mere possession of the child-whether obtained
by means of a lawful out-of-state "visitation" decree in the original suit
or by abduction. The parent with the best combination of money, social
prominence, and political and/or fraternal ties often has an advantage in
these battles which bears no relationship to the child's best interests8 2
cruelty, mental cruelty, and other erratic conduct. The child had apparently
contracted his heart ailment on the father's military tour of duty in Turkey. In
ordering the child to be sent on the first visit, the judge rationalized: "If it didn't
kill him to go to Turkey, it won't kill him to go to El Paso." He chose to ignore
the fact that the infant had gone to Turkey with both parents; and that the father
was a total stranger to his son, since he had refused to see him for 15 months,
having abandoned him and the mother at Kennedy International Airport en route
home from Turkey when the minor was only 21a years old.
76. Cook v. Cook, 185 F.2d 945 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Helton v. Crawley, 241
Iowa 296, 41 N.W.2d 60 (1950); Gilman v. Morgan, 158 Fla. 605, 29 So. 2d
372, cert. denied, 331 U.S. 796 (1947). See also Hazard, supra note 2, at 392, for
cases on point cited in footnotes therein.
77. 83 Conn. 479, 77 A. 1 (1910).
78. Id. at 492, 77 A. at 6.
79. 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948). A number of previous cases had
considered this possibility. See note 81 infra.
80. Id. at 778, 197 P.2d at 749 (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 780, 197 P.2d at 750, citing Stansbury, Custody and Maintenance
Law Across State Lines, 10 LAw & CoNmurn'. PitoB. 819, 831-32 (1944) (em-
phasis added). See Stafford v. Stafford, 287 Ky. 804, 155 S.W.2d 220 (1941);
White v. Shalit, 136 Me. 65, 1 A.2d 765 (1938); Goldsmith v. Salkey, 131 Tex.
139, 112 S.W.2d 165 (1938).
82. See notes 6 and 75 supra. In the original divorce action in that case,
although the child was neither domiciled nor present on Texas soil during the
pendency of the suit, alternate prerequisites under Texas law, and in contra-
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Unchecked litigation and relitigation of child custody is almost always at
the expense of an innocent child.
IV. JUDICILaL ATTEMPTS TO ALLEVIATE THE PLIGHT OF THE
INTERSTATE s4 CHILD
A. Restriction of Out-of-State Visitation
1. In the Original Custody Decree
As long as the child remains physically present within the custodial
parent's state of domicile, a foreign state lacking personal jurisdiction over
the custodial parent cannot effectively relitigate the child's custody.85 By
granting only in-state visitation rights to the noncustodial parent, a state
can provide some protection against involving the child in interstate custody
battles.
In York v. York,86 the original custody decree gave the noncustodial
parent visitation rights, but provided that she was not to remove the chil-
dren from the Iowa county of the custodian's domicile. She later applied
to modify the decree asking that the children be allowed to visit her in
Ohio for three weeks each summer. The Iowa Supreme Court refused to
modify the decree, stating that:
It is particularly hazardous to allow children permanently in
the custody of a resident to be placed temporarily and from time
to time in the custody of a nonresident. It not only often results in
costly and lengthy litigation for the resident custodian, . . . but is
conducive to "interstate bickering" over the custody of children.
It is obvious such conflicts would be detrimental to the best inter-
ests of the children. . . . Thus we are not surprised at plantiff-
appellant's great concern over any modification which will in effect
place the children in a foreign jurisdiction when he may be called
upon to defend his custodial rights once fairly and conclusively
obtained by him under the original circumstances. It is not mere
whim or fictitious objections that he voices, nor a remote danger to
the present peace and security of the children .... s1
vention of general Texas law forbidding split custody, the Texas court entered
a custody-visitation decree, permitting the father, an Army colonel, who had
testified that he was living in one-room bachelor officer quarters on an Army
post, to have the child with him from July 1 to 31 and December 5 to 31, each
year. No. 11,250, DC, Walker County, Texas.
83. See e.g., Hixson v. Hixson, supra note 3, at 601.
84. This term was introduced by Professor Ehrenzweig in his article The
Interstate Child and Uniform Legislation: A Plea for Extralitigious Proceedings,
64 MicH. L. REv. 1 (1965).
85. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953). See pt. ImI of this article.
86. 246 Iowa 132, 67 N.W.2d 28 (1954). See Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 432(1951); Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 148, 153 (1963); Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d 695, 717(1963).87. 246 Iowa at 141-42, 67 N.W.2d at 34. The court's attitude was that
the limitation on visiting rights was in the child's best interests, Id. at 139-40,
67 N.W.2d at 32, and that, if the mother cared for the children, she would find
a way to visit them in Iowa. Id. at 148, 67 N.W.2d at 35.
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In a similar decision, Anonymous v. Anonymous,88 an Ohio court denied
a noncustodial parent's request that his eight-year-old daughter be allowed
to visit him in New York. Noting the distance of travel, that the child was
an innocent party to the divorce, and the possibility that the child would
become involved in custody litigation in New York, the court found that
"the best and most equitable arrangement" would be for the father to visit
his child in Ohio. 9
Although courts may limit visitation, the noncustodial parent is gen-
erally granted some form of access to the child-the rationale being that
in the event of the custodian's death or incapacity, the child can make a
smoother adjustment to living with a parent he had previously visited
rather than one who is a stranger. In Friedland v. Friedland,90 however,
the California Court of Appeals upheld a custody decree which awarded
absolute custody of a three and a half year-old son to his mother and
denied the father all visitation rights. The mother had been given complete
care, control, and custody of the child by a previous court order, after which
the father was arrested and convicted for nonsupport of his son. The father
had later threatened "in a vengeful manner" that he would obtain his son.
The mother believed that if her former spouse were to acquire possession
of the boy for even one day he would take the child beyond the court's
jurisdiction. She testified that because her home had been broken into
several time, she had taken the child to the home of relatives in Minnesota.
The mother feared the father would harm the child.91 As Friedland demon-
strates, the right to visitation is not absolute;92 the best interest of the child
is controlling.
Occasionally a trial93 or appellate94 court will prohibit the visiting
parent from removing the child from the state,95 county,96 or city of resi-
dence 7 of the custodian. This is an additional safeguard against "seize,
run and sue" tactics.
2. Modification of the Custody Decree
Courts will consider past instances of out-of-state custody relitigation
in modifying custody rights. In MacWhinney v. MacWhinney,98 the cus-
todial father sought and was granted a modification of his custody rights
88. 18 Ohio Ops. 2d 282, 88 Ohio L. Abs. 398, 180 N.E.2d 205 (C.P. 1962);
88 A.L.R.2d 161, 185 (1963).
89. Id. at 288, 180 N.E.2d at 206.
90. 174 Cal. App. 2d 874, 345 P.2d 822 (1959); see 88 A.L.R.2d 207, 208,
151, 165, 205 (1963).
91. 174 Cal. App. 2d at 880, 345 P.2d at 325.
92. Id.
93. Lasater v. Bagley, 217 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. Civ, App. 1949).
94. Paynter v. Janca, 331 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
95. Sachse v. Sacbse, 150 So. 2d 772 (La. App. 1963).
96. Supra note 86. See also Elkind v. Harding, 143 N.E.2d 752 (Ohio App.
1957); Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 127 (1964).
97. Note 124, infra.
98. 248 Minn. 308, 79 N.W.2d 783 (1956).
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to prevent his eight-year-old daughter from having to go to California for
an annual visit with her mother. The mother had sued for permanent cus-
tody in California courts on the child's previous visit, had successfully over-
turned the prior Minnesota decree, and obtained a California decree giving
her custody of the child. When the child subsequently returned to Minne-
sota to visit the father for the summer, the father petitioned the Minnesota
courts to deprive the mother of all visitation rights. The Minnesota Su-
preme Court modified the original decree, restricting the mother's visits
with her child to Minnesota. The modification was based upon the mother's
willful violation of the original decree in refusing to return the child and
resorting to the courts of another state. In denying the out-of-state visita-
tion, the court reasoned:
... No young child should be made the victim of a tug of war
between parents or between the courts of two conflicting jurisdic-
tions ... It can only lead to bitterness between the child and one
or both of its parents. For this same reason, the court was justified
in depriving the mother of all right to take the child from the
father's home to California.99
In Carter v. Carter,100 the husband obtained a divorce and custody of
the six-year-old son on grounds of desertion in the state of Maryland. The
mother was granted summer "visitation" privileges in New York. When she
refused to return the child, the father instituted habeas corpus proceedings
in New York, during the pendency of which Mrs. Carter secreted the child
to Canada and subsequently to Connecticut, where the father regained
possession of him with the help of a detective. The Maryland Court of
Appeals cancelled the out-of-state "visitation" on grounds of unclean
hands.1'0 Once a noncustodial parent has demonstrated that he will sub-
ject the child to a custody fight in a foreign jurisdiction, it may be in the
best interests of the child to prohibit the noncustodian from removing the
child out of court's jurisdiction.
3. Visitation v. Split Custody
Visitation is "the right of divorced parent denied the custody of a
minor child to visit such child at such times and places as the court may
fix in its decree."102 Custody, on the other hand, "connotes the right to
establish the child's domicile and includes the elements of immediate care
and direct control of the child, together with provision for its needs." 03
Custody is also described as including "within its meaning every element
99. Id. at 308, 79 N.W.2d at 687.
100. 156 Md. 500, 144 A. 490 (1929). See Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 1273 (1963).
101. 156 Md. at 507, 144 A. at 498. See also Brown v. Brown, 835 Mich.
511, 56 N.W.2d 867 (1953) (father absconded with children to South Africa).
102. BALLE. n~ms LAW DICTIONARY at 1347 (3d ed. 1969).
103. Campbell v. Campbell, 441 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
See also Selby v. Selby, 124 N.E.2d 772 (Ohio App. 1952); McFadden v. Mc-
Fadden, 206 Ore. 253, 292 P.2d 795 (1956); Leithold v. Plass, infra note 132.
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of provision for the physical, moral, and mental well-being of the children
and implies that the person having custody has the immediate personal
care and control of the children."104 It has been held that "these rights in-
herent in a custody decree are not held by one enjoying visitation rights,"10 5
that "a decree which merely permits visitation does not authorize the visit-
ing parent to transport the child away from its home," 06 and that "the right
of visitation should not be extended to the point where it becomes a divided
custody or the equivalent thereof." 0 7
In child custody disputes, a court typically awards one parent full
custody and grants the other parent some form of visitation rights. There
is a general reluctance to divide custody between the two parents, making
each parent custodian for a part of the year. 08 Courts recognize that in
most situations such split custody is not in the best interests of the child.'0 9
Courts do not always recognize, however, that out-of-state visitation, even
though commonly granted to the noncustodial parent, often amounts to
split custody. The custodial parent loses effective care and control of the
child while he visits out-of-state.110 The child's homelife with the custodial
parent is disrupted."'
Although it did not deal with an interstate child situation, Martin v.
104. Selby v. Selby, 124 N.E.2d 772, 773-74 (Ohio App. 1952).
105. Campbell v. Campbell, supra note 103, at 660.
106. McDermett v. McDermett, 192 Minn. 32,255 N.W. 247 (1934).
107. Butts v. Butts, 248 Ala. 431, 28 So. 2d 183 (1946); McGetrick v.
McGetrick, 204 Ore. 645, 284 P.2d 352 (1952); Commonwealth ex rel. Hubbell
v. Hubbell, 176 Pa. Super. 186, 107 A.2d 388 (1954); Patrick v. Patrick, 17
Wis. 2d 43, 117 N.W.2d 256 (1962).
108. McLemore v. McLemore, 846 S.W.2d 722 (Ky. App. 1961); McFadden
v. McFadden, 206 Ore. 253, 292 P.2d 795 (1956); Allen v. Allen, 200 Ore. 278,
268 P.2d 358 (1954); Bartlett v. Bartlett, 293 S.W.2d 508 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956);
Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d 691, 736 (1963g. In Milim v. Mayfield, 285 S.W.2d 852
(Tex. Civ. A pp. 1955), the court stated:
It has been generally held that divided custody of a child of tender
years between its parents should not be permitted except under special
conditions in which there is no reasonable alternative and it is made
essential if not absolutely necessary.
285 S.W.2d at 854. See also Plant, The Psychiatrist Views Children of Divorced
Parents, 10 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 807, 812 (1944).
109. Richardson v. Richardson, 72 Idaho 19, 236 P.2d 718 (1951); McCann
v. McCann, 167 Md. 167, 173 A. 7 (App. 1937); McDermett v. McDermett,
192 Minn. 32, 255 N.W. 247 (1934); Hixson v. Hixson, 199 Ore. 559, 263 P.2d
597 (1953); Logan v. Logan, 176 S.W.2d 601 (Tenn. App. 1943); Immel v.
Immel, 231 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950); Martin v. Martin, 182 S.W.2d
426 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
110. Dunavant v. Dunavant, 219 S.W.2d 910 (Tenn. App. 1949).
. . [Sio long as there is a divided custody there will probably be
bickerings and disputes and a natural tendency on the part of the child
to play one parent against the other, as well as for the claimants to seek
by indulgences to curry favor with the child, if not to prejudice it
against the other.
Id. at 915.
111. Hetsley v. Hetsley, 242 S.W.2d 973 (Ky. App. 1951); Kaehler v.
Kaehler, 219 Minn. 536, 18 N.W.2d 312 (1945); Larson v. Larson, 176 Minn.
490, 223 N.W. 789 (1929). The court in Dunn v. Dunn, 217 S.W.2d 124 (Tex.
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Martin112 is the leading and most often cited case on the issue of split
custody. One paragraph of Judge Alexander's opinion, frequently quoted
by courts of other states, is equally applicable to interstate custody
relitigation.
In our opinion, the original decree awarding the child part
time to each of the parents was unwise. Certainly, no child could
grow up normally when it is hawked about from one parent to the
other with the embarassing scene of changing homes at least twice
each year. Such decrees are usually prompted by a laudable desire
to avoid injuring the feelings of the parents, but the net result is a
permanent injury to the child without any substantial benefit to the
parents. In addition to the lack of stability in his surroundings, the
child is constantly reminded that he is the center of a parental
quarrel. It is readily apparent that such practices are calculated to
arouse serious emotional conflicts in the mind of the child and are
not conducive to good citizenship. Moreover, the parents are con-
tinuously pitted against each other in the unenviable contest of
undermining the child's love for the other parent. Each parent is
afraid to exercise any sort of discipline for fear of losing out in the
contest. As a result, the child is reared without parental control.
Such decrees by which the child is awarded part time to each of
the parents have been condemned by numerous decisions.113
Many courts have spoken out against the pernicious effects of divided
custody upon children. The rule of Martin has been followed by the various
courts of Kansas,114 Oregon, 15 Idaho,"i 6 Minnesota,"i7 Washington," 8
Kentucky,"l9 Maryland,120 New Jersey,'12  Louisiana, 22 Iowa,123 Arkan-
Civ. App. 1948) stated:
... [S]uch a condition inevitably has the effect of disturbing and con-
fusing their lives . . . and constitutes an extreme disturbance in the
serenity and orderly, methodical home-life and education which are
essential in the lives of growing children and constitutes a wholesome
influence on their growth and development into good citizens. To require
a child to change its home twice each year and to live a portion of the
year under the dominating influences of one family and the remaining
portion of the year in another home and under the control and supervi-
sion of another family would constitute a continuous frustration and
destroy the salutary environments in which a child ought to live. In our
opinion children should never be subjected to such conditions except,
possibly, in cases of extreme necessity.
Id. at 126.
112. 132 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
113. Id. at 428 (emphasis added).
114. White v. White, 160 Kan. 32, 159 P.2d 461 (1945).
115. Allen v. Allen, supra note 4. Hixson v. Hixson, supra note 3.
116. Richardson v. Richardson, 72 Idaho 19, 236 P.2d 718 (1951).
117. Larson v. Larson, 176 Minn. 490, 228 N.W. 789 (1929).
118. Mason v. Mason, 163 Wash. 539, 1 P.2d 885 (1931).
119. McLemore v. McLemore, 346 S.W.2d 722 (Ky. App. 1961); Towles
v. Towles, 176 Ky. 225, 195 S.W. 437 (Ct. App. 1917).
120. McCann v. McCann, 167 Md. 167, 173 A. 7 (Ct. App. 1934).
121. Campbell v. Campbell, 96 N.J. Eq. 898, 180 A. 861 (1924).
122. Bush v. Bush, 163 So. 2d 858 (La. App. 1964); Holley v. Holley, 158
So. 2d 620 (La. App. 1963).
128. York v. York, supra note 86.
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sas, 124 Tennessee,1 25 Florida, 1 26 Michigan,127 and Mississippi. 28 Perhaps
the minds of judges hark back to the Biblical tale of the two women each
claiming to be the mother of the surviving child and Solomon's threat to
cleave the infant in two with his sword.' 29
Some courts have restricted an out-of-state visitation on the grounds
that it constituted split custody. In In re DeFord,30 the trial court entered
a decree in a divorce action, awarding custody to the father during the
school year subject to the right of the mother to have her son with her in
Texas during the summer. The father had the responsibility and the ex-
penses of fetching and returning the five-year-old boy. The Supreme Court
of North Carolina struck down the split custody decree on the rationale
that when the child went to Texas, the power of the courts of North Caro-
lina to exercise control over him would be ousted. The courts of Texas
would acquire jurisdiction, and the decree awarding his custody to the
father would be rendered wholly ineffectual:
... A court will not adjudicate where it cannot enforce the adjudi-
cation, or turn its suitors over to another tribunal to obtain justice,
or vest the losing litigant with power to defeat the jurisdiction of
the court and thus nullify the relief granted the successful suitor,
or enter a decree by the very terms of which it will be divested of
jurisdiction and left powerless to compel obedience....
Hence, in a proceeding of this nature, in the absence of unusual
circumstances, a court should not enter an order which permits the
infant to be removed from the state by one to whom unqualified
custody has not been awarded.1 3 1
The dividing line between custody and visitation is indistinct. In
Leitliold v. Plass,13 2 the Supreme Court of Texas held that a two-week
sojourn by the minor son with the adoptive father in California, in lieu of
one-day visits in the adoptive mother's Texas home, constituted a modifica-
tion of visitation rights rather than an award of split custody. The court
felt that two weeks out of the state was a visitation. In Leaverton v. Leaver-
ton, 183 on the other hand, the Dallas Court of Civil Appeals refused a
noncustodial father's request that his nine-year-old daughter be sent from
Alabama to Texas to visit him for two weeks one year and four weeks in
124. Sindle v. Sindle, 229 Ark. 209, 315 S.W.2d 893 (1958); Aaron v.
Aaron, 228 Ark. 27, 305 S.W.2d 550 (1957).
125. Dunavant v. Dunavant, 31 Tenn. App. 634, 219 S.W.2d 910 (1949);
Rowles v. Reynolds, 29 Tenn. App. 224, 196 S.W.2d 76 (1946).
126. Phillips v. Phillips, 153 Fla. 133, 13 So. 2d 922 (1943).
127. Vines v. Vines, 344 Mich. 222, 73 N.W.2d 913 (1955).
128. Brocato v. Walker, 220 So. 2d 340 (Miss. 1969).
129. 1 Kings. 3:16-3:28.
130. 226 N.C. 189, 37 S.E.2d 516 (1946).
131. Id. at 192, 37 S.E.2d at 517-18. See also King v. King, 202 Ga. 838,
44 S.E.2d 791 (1947).
132. 413 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. 1967).
133. 417 S.W.2d 82 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
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subsequent years. The father contended that he was merely clarifying
existing visiting rights. 34 The court considered his request an attempt to
modify the original custody decree without showing changed circum-
stances.1 3 5 Leithold was distinguished on the basis that it involved a period
of only two weeks.136 Apparently the court in Leaverton thought that four
weeks constituted split custody, while two weeks amounted to visitation. 3 7
B. Bonding
A instrument commonly used by the courts to discourage further liti-
gation by a nonresident parent granted permission to remove the child
temporarily beyond the court's jurisdiction is to impose a bond upon him
or her, conditioned upon the faithful performance of the terms of the
order and the return of the child to the domicile.13 8 The danger here lies,
as was pointed out in Page v. Page, 39 in that, while a bond may possibly
secure the payment of damages, it may not produce the child. At present
day prices and costs of services, a minimum of $10,000 would be necessary
to meet expenses of attorneys, court costs, detectives, and transportation
to recover the child. Usually, however, such bonds are set at $500140 or
$1,000.141
V. SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS
A. The Texas Rule
While various panaceas to interstate child custody relitigation have
been proposed, thus far only one jurisdiction has approached a workable
solution. Texas alone has established the rule that modification of a custody
decree is governed by the law of venue.142 The action-considered new and
independent of the divorce decree-must be brought in the county where
134. Id. at 85.
135. Id.
186. Id. at 86.
187. In McFarland v. Boyd, 431 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), the
trial court modified a New Mexico divorce decree by giving the father the right
to have his twelve-year-old son and ten-year-old daughter visit him in Nebraska
for two weeks each summer in lieu of his visiting them at their mother's resi-
dence in Amarillo. The appeals court considered itself bound by Leithold and
accordingly affirmed.
188. See New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, supra note 9. Commonwealth
ex rel. Warner v. Warner, 156 Pa. Super. 465, 40 A.2d 886 (1945). See also
Sanders v. Sanders, 63 Wash. 2d 709, 888 P.2d 942 (1964); Annot., 15
A.L.R.2d, §§ 11-13 (1951); 24 Am. Jur. 2D Divorce and Separation § 782 (1966).
139. 166 N.C. 90, 81 S.E. 1060 (1914). See also Harris v. Harris, 115 N.C.
587, 20 S.E. 187 (1894).
140. Leithold v. Plass, 413 S.W.2d 698, 700 (Tex. 1967); Annot., 92
A.L.R.2d 695 (1968); Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 432 (1951).
141. See cases cited at Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 482 (1951).
142. Spell v. Green, 144 Tex. 535, 192 S.W.2d 260 (1946); Lakey v. Mc-
Carroll, 134 S.W.2d 1016 (Tex. 1940); Ellington v. Floyd, 255 S.W.2d 948
(Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
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the custodian and child reside. Case law is unclear whether a Texas court
having personal jurisdiction over the parents can confer a custody-visitation
award as part of the divorce decree where the child is neither domiciled nor
present on its soil during the pendency of the suit. 48
B. The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
Fully cognizant of the evils flowing from interstate custody litigation
and disheatened that neither the United States Congress nor Supreme
Court were demonstrating any propensity toward alleviating the plight of
the interstate child, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted in
July, 1968, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, which was ap-
proved by the American Bar Association the following month. 44
The Act is an attempt to bring some semblance of order into the now
existent chaos. The avowed purposes in section 1 are to:
(1) avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts of
other states in matters of child custody which have in the past
resulted in the shifting of children from state to state with
harmful effects on their well-being;
(2) promote cooperation with the courts of other states to the end
that a custody decree is rendered in that state which can best
decide the case in the interest of the child;
(3) assure that litigation concerning the custody of a child take
place ordinarily in the state with which the child and his fam-
ily have the closest connection and where significant evidence
concerning his care, protection, training, and personal relation-
ships is most readily available, and that the courts of this state
decline the exercise of jurisdiction when the child and his
family have a closer connection with another state;
(4) discourage continuing controversies over child custody in the
interest of greater stability of home environment and of secure
family relationships for the child;
(5) deter abductions and other unilateral removals of children
undertaken to obtain custody awards;
(6) avoid re-litigation of custody decisions of other states in this
state insofar as feasible;
(7) facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of other states;
(8) promote and expand the exchange of information and other
forms of mutual assistance between the courts of this state and
those of other states concerned with the same child; and(9) make uniform the law of those states which enact it.145
Section 2 consists of definitions of terminology peculiar to child "cus-
tody proceedings," which is broadly defined to include divorce and separa-
143. Cf. DeLaughter, v. DeLaughter, 370 S.W.2d 207, 208 (Tex. Civ. App.
1968), wherein it was said that alternate prerequisites for a court to have juris-
diction to enter a custody decree are domicile or presence of the child on Texas
soil.
144. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, UNI-
FOnm CmD CUSTODY JUrisDICTION ACT (1968). Bodenheimer, supra note 9,
at 1216.
145. Unrtonm CmLD CUSTODY JUmIsDICTION ACT § 1, at 7.
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tion, child neglect, dependency, habeas corpus, guardianship, and related
actions.
The nub of the Act is found in section 3, which establishes two major
bases for jurisdiction empowering a court to initially enter or modify a cus-
tody decree: (1) the court of a child's "home state" has jurisdiction; or
(2) if there is no "home state" or if the child and his family have equal or
stronger ties with another state, a court of that state has jurisdiction.146
Any concurrent jurisdiction under these tests is to be resolved by Sections
6 and 7-which provide that courts are expected to ferret out information
about any other custody proceedings concerning the same child. They then
shall, by mutual agreement, yield to the "appropriate forum." This later
phrase apparently means that if courts of more than one state have jurisdic-
tion over the child, the priority in time principle shall prevail unless pre-
empted by the inconvenient forum principle. 147 The nebulousness of the
term ostensibly is to be left for resolution by "consultation and cooperation"
among the courts in accordance with some guidelines for determining the
inconvenient forum issue and correct proceedings after its determination. 48
"Home state" is a variation of the "established home" concept intro-
duced by Professor Ratuer. 149 It is defined as-
the state in which the child immediately preceding the time in-
volved lived with his parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent,
for at least 6 consecutive months, and in the case of a child less
than 6 months old the state in which the child lived from birth with
any of the persons mentioned. Periods of temporary absence of any
of the named persons are counted as part of the 6-month or other
period.150
In cases of abandonment or other emergencies such as abuse, provision
is made for a state in its capacity as parens patriae to assume jurisdiction
over a child physically present within its borders in order to provide it with
immediate protection. Neglect alone, however, will not give rise to such
jurisdiction.151 If no other court can or has assumed jurisdiction under the
previous subsections, a court so petitioned may-if it is in the best interest
of the child. 152
Physical presence of the child and one parent in the state is not enough
to confer jurisdiction on the court, except in the last two instances. 53
Physical presence of the child is also not a prerequisite for jurisdiction to
determine his custody.154
146. Id., Commissioner's Note, § 8.
147. Id., Commissioner's Note, § 6.
148. Id., Commissioner's Note, § 7.
149. Ratner, Child Custody in a Federal System, 62 MicH. L. REv. 795,
815-16 (1964).
150. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JUmSDIcTION AcT § 2(5) (1968).
151. Id., Commissioner's Note, § 8(a) (8).
152. d., § 8(a) (4).
158. Id., § 3(b).
154. Id., § 3(c).
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The Act next provides reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard
to contestants, parents whose rights have not been previously terminated,
and any person who has physical custody of the child.155 In the case of
nonresidents, notice may be either by personal service or by certified mail
with return receipt.156 Publication in lieu of other means is precluded. If a
person submits to the jurisdiction of the court, notice is not required. 57
The Act also embodies the "clean hands" doctrine. One who has
abducted a child from another state or has indulged in other reprehensible
conduct may not enlist the aid of a court in modifying the extant custody
decree of another state.'58 Unfortunately, the declinature by the court is
permissive and not mandatory; the court may decline to exercise jurisdiction
when "just and proper under the circumstances." 159 This section also im-
poses a penalty upon an errant petitioner. The court dismissing his com-
plaint can dun him for its court costs, travel expenses, and attorney fees
incurred by other parties and their witnesses.160
The initial pleading in a custody proceeding under the Act must be
made under oath.' 6 ' It must state the child's address and the names of his
guardians for the past five years. The affiant must also list all prior custody
proceedings involving the same child, whether other such proceedings
pend in another state, and whether other individuals not joined as parties
defendant have an interest in the child. 62 If the court ascertains that a
person not joined in the suit has physical custody or claims to have cus-
tody or visitation rights with respect to the child, it must order his joinder
as a party defendant and notify him thereof.16 3 If such person is a non-
resident, service is made upon him as previously noted. 6 4 This section
seeks to prevent relitigation of custody by claimants other than parents.
The court may order any party to the proceeding who is within the
state to appear personally before it. It may order the custodian to appear
with the child. It may order a nonresident to appear personally with or
without the child, with a caveat that failure to obey may result in a deci-
sion adverse to the defaulter. It may also order the expenses of the non-
resident and the child paid by another party, through the court registry,
if circumstances make it just and proper.165
Any custody decree rendered in accordance with the terms of the Act
by a court of competent jurisdiction binds all parties who have been served,
155. Id., § 4.
156. Id., § 5.
157. Id., § 5(d).
158. Id., I 8(a).159. Id., § 8a.
160. Id., § 8(c
161. Id., § 9(a).
162. Id.
163. Id., § 10.
164. Id., § 5.
165. Id., § 11.
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notified, or who have made an appearance in the proceeding and have
been given an opportunity to be heard.1 6 6 The decree is conclusive on all
issues of law and fact determined. Since a custody decree is normally sub-
ject to modification in the interest of the child upon a showing of a ma-
terial change of circumstances, it does not have absolute finality. As long
as it has not been altered, however, it is binding as a final judgment.
The key to the entire Act is section 13. It requires a state to recognize
and enforce the custody decrees of a foreign state which had assumed
jurisdiction under the provisions of the Act or under circumstances satis-
fying the Act's provisions. In effect, it declares that full faith and credit
must be given a valid out-of-state decree if due process requirements of
notice and opportunity to be heard have been met. Personal jurisdiction
over the defendant is not necessary.6 Conceivably, if the prior modified
decree is a punitive or disciplinary one, courts in other states might be re-
luctant to recognize and enforce it. This problem could be alleviated by
enforcement of the visitation provisions of the original decree, or if condi-
tions change materially, by a petition for their modification.168
A sister state may not modify a custody decree unless the former state
no longer has jurisdiction, or if it has declined to assume jurisdiction to
modify the decree and the second state court has jurisdiction within the
purview of the Act.169 In other words, a court's jurisdiction continues in
effect only as long as the requisite jurisdictional standards of the Act are
met. When modifying a foreign decree, a court must give due considera-
tion to the documents and records of the former one, in order to be as
fully informed as possible before entering a decision. What constitutes
"due consideration" is a matter of discretion and local law. 70
A certified copy of a custody decree of a sister state may be filed with
the clerk of the appropriate court of any other state, where it shall have
the same effect and be enforced in the same manner.17' Violation of the
decree may subject the wrongdoer to all necessary expenses incurred in its
enforcement by the wronged party.172 It should be noted, however, that
enforcement and modification are not synonymous. A petition for modifi-
cation must be addressed to the same court where the decree is being
filed. Likewise enforcement is not mandatory; it may be stayed if there is
danger of abuse or mistreatment of the child.' 7 3
The clerk of each state court is required to maintain a registry in
which he shall file certified copies of custody decrees of sister states, com-
166. Id., § 12.
167. Id., Commissioner's Note, § 18.
168. Id.
169. Id., § 14.
170. Id.
171. Id., § 15(a).
172. Id., § 15 (b).
178. Id., Commissioner's Note, § 15.
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munications concerning findings of inconvenient forum of sister states, and
other documents concerning custody proceedings from sister states which
may affect later custody actions.174 The purpose of this section of the Act is
to compile a complete case history of the child's custody in a single place.175
The same clerk may forward certified copies of his court's decree to other
courts or to interested parties.'78
Section 18 allows any party to a custody suit to utilize depositions,
written interrogatories, and other discovery devices to adduce testimony
of witnesses, parties, or children involved in another state. The procedural
rules of the state where the materials are to be used control the dis-
covery.'77 In addition, the section authorizes the court sua sponte to gather
any out-of-state evidence which it deems necessary and proper to convey
a true picture of the child's circumstances, prescribing the manner and the
terms under which it shall be taken. 78
In a unique provision the Act enables a court of one state to request
the appropriate court of another state to hold a hearing to gather evidence
or to hold an investigation with respect to the child's custody and forward
certified copies of the results to it, with costs taxed against the parties to
the litigation or against the originating state. 7 9 The court may also request
the appropriate court of another state to order its resident party to appear
in custody proceedings in the former one with the child, making monetary
provisions for such appearance at its discretion. This makes possible an
organized network of contempt power; however, the section is permissive
in nature. 80 The provisions of section 19 are reciprocated in section 20,
which empowers local courts to aid out-of-state courts in a like manner.'8 '
The clerk of courts is further authorized to preserve pleadings, orders
and decrees, and other pertinent documents until the child reaches the age
of 18 or 21; and upon the request of the court of another state, he shall for-
ward certified copies of any or all such papers to it.'8 2
Section 23 extends the general policies of the Act beyond national
borders provided that the foreign country's custody decree was rendered
by appropriate authorities and that reasonable notice and opportunity to be
heard was given to all persons affected by the decree.183
Finally, an optional section of the Act provides that when an issue of
existence or exercise of jurisdiction by a court is raised, it shall be given
court calendar priority and handled expeditiously in order to keep at a
174. Id., § 16.
175. Id., Commissioner's Note, § 16.
176. Id., § 17.
177. Id., Commissioner's Note, § 18.
178. Id., § 18.
179. Id., § 19(a).
180. Id., Commissioner's Note, § 19.
181. Id., § 20.
182. Id., § 21.
188. Id., § 23.
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minimum the duration of the period of uncertainty and turmoil in a child's
life. 84
While there is much of value in the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act, many of its provisions are impracticable and naive when considered in
the contemporary light of the American court scene. It lacks explicit stan-
dards and guidelines for all judges to follow in reaching custody-visitation
decisions. Misuse of the "priority in time"' 5 and "inconvenient forum" 80
rules could result in highly subjective jurisdictional decisions which would
further encourage "seize and sue" tactics by contesting parents. Another
problem is the expense involved in implementing the record keeping and
discovery provisions of the Act.
The most important failing of the Act lies in the states' delay in en-
acting it into law. The Act has been in existence six years; yet only five
states have adopted it.8 7 The Act will never be effective unless a substan-
tial number of states enact it as state law.
C. The Writer's Solution
In the opinion of this writer, the solution to interstate custody relitiga-
tion lies in a federal statute requiring that in any action whatsoever con-
cerning custody and/or visitation of a minor child-be it an original di-
vorce action or an application to modify-venue must lie in the county of
the domiciliary custodian of said child (i.e., an embodiment of the Texas
rule on a national scale),1ss When a marriage disintegrates, inevitably the
children remain with one parent. Only the state court where that parent
is domiciled or resides would be empowered to enter a custody-visitation
decree. Since procedural rules of most-if not all-states provide for venue
in civil actions in the county of defendant's residence, the statute would
not play havoc with established procedural rules. The statute would be in
the "best interests of the child."
Jurisdiction over the child would change as the permanent custodian
found it necessary to move for cogent and compelling reasons. The cus-
todian would register his custody decree with the appropriate new state
court and request that the child be declared its ward; or, in the alternative,
the registration could effect this automatically, to spare the custodian
added unnecessary legal expense. Any petitions for modification of the
184. Id., § 24.
185. Id., § 6(c).
186. Id., § 7(a).
187. CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 5150-74 (West Supp. 1974); CoLO. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 46-6-1-46-6-26 (Supp. 1973); HAwAu &~v. STAT. §§ 583-1 to -26(Supp. 1973); N.D. CENT'r. CODE §§ 14-14-01 to -26 (1971); Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§§ 20-143 to-167 (Supp. 1978).
188. Congress arguably has power to enact this type of legislation pursuant
to its power to enforce the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, see
Ratner, Child Custody in a Federal System, 62 MicH. L. REv. 795, 827n.153(1964), or its broad powers under Article I, § 7, to regulate interstate commerce.
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decree would be addressed to this court, and it would subject all parties
involved to a thorough investigation. Failure on the part of an indispensable
party to cooperate would result in a ruling adverse to him or her. In the
event of the death of the child's custodian, jurisdiction to enter a modified
custody decree would still be in the court where the child is domiciled.
Wardship would subsequently be transferred, if necessary, to the domi-
ciliary court of the new custodian.
To stem the evils of split custody, the court having jurisdiction should
consider the following guidelines: Visitations for children under twelve
would be limited to the county of the custodian's residence, with liberal
privileges accorded the noncustodian-as long as they do not interfere
with the well-being of the minors and do not disrupt the tranquility of
their home. Out-of-state or out-of-town visits for children over twelve
would be subject to the individual child's wishes, to be determined by
separate conferences with (1) a qualified nonpartisan referee appointed by
the court and approved by both parties; (2) a child psychiatrist, psycholo-
gist, or family doctor; and (3) a teacher or minister who is acquainted
with the child and has its respect and confidence. Their individual reports
would be available to both parties as well as to the courts.
VI. CONCLUSION
The status of custody-visitation litigation in the United States is a
hideous, cancerous chancre on the body of American jurisprudence. Each
time a child crosses a state line, his custody is subject to relitigation by the
noncustodial parent. What is perpetrated by our courts upon the innocent
"interstate child" is often not in his "best interests."
A prerequisite to custody relitigation is possession of the child, whether
legal or illegal. Usually the noncustodian gains possession through a grant
of visitation in the divorce decree. Judges commonly send infants beyond
the borders of their home state on "visitations," even though they sometimes
last several months and amount to split custody. American courts have
suited the convenience and desire of the noncustodial parent, while sacri-
ficing the well-being of children, as an inducement to him to pay child
support regularly and thus keep his issue off the welfare rolls.'8 9 In the
words of Justice Jackson of the United States Supreme Court, dissenting in
May v. Anderson: "A state of law such as this,... has little to commend it
in legal logic or as a principle of order in a federal system."190
189. Plant, The Psychiatrist Views Children of Divorced Parents, 10 LAw &
CONTrMP. PnoB. 807, 812 (1944).
Our experience has been that undue importance has been given
to the factor of support and the rights it entails ...Could we turn
our faces towards decisions that boldly consider the rights of the
children ....
Id. at 817.
190. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 539 (1953).
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The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, approved by the Ameri-
can Bar Association in 1968, has fallen short of its desired goal-the cessa-
tion of a multiplicity of suits in regard to one child's custody. Its provi-
sions are cumbersome and unpracticable. Its loopholes could perpetuate
some of the very evils it is seeking to alleviate.
Immediate corrective steps must be taken to remedy the vicious inter-
state warfare waged by parents over the custody of their children. All
custody-visitation actions should be subject to the law of venue in the
local court of the domiciliary or resident custodian. The crisis of stemming
relitigation of a child's custody can only be met by positive action, making
Justice Jackson's pronouncement in May v. Anderson-"children as well as
the home keeping parent [have the right] to have their status determined
with reasonable certainty, and to be free from an incessant tug of war
between squabbling parents"' 91-a reality, at long last.
191. Id. at 542.
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